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Conspiracy Theories Erupt Over American Airlines Mid-Air Crash

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Michael_Novakhov
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What We Know About the Plane and Helicopter Crash Near Washington

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Michael_Novakhov
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US Army Black Hawk reportedly failed to respond to warnings before DC crash

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An investigation is underway to establish the cause of a crash between a US Army Black Hawk helicopter and an American Airlines passenger plane after the helicopter apparently failed to respond to proximity warnings.

The crash happened near Reagan Washington National Airport in Washington DC, with all 67 onboard the two aircraft feared dead.

According to Sky News, audio shows air traffic control asking the Black Hawk crew if they have visual of the civilian aircraft and asking them to manoeuvre behind it

"PAT25 [military helicopter], do you have a CRJ [American Airlines] in sight? PAT25, pass behind the CRJ," the controller is quoted as having said.

It appears there was no response from the Black Hawk to any of the warnings.

Video footage shows two sets of aircraft lights in the area behind the Lincoln Memorial, eventually crossing paths before an explosion is seen in mid-air.

According to flight tracking information from the passenger plane's radio transponder, the American Airlines flight is believed to have been travelling at 140mph at 400ft when it suffered a rapid loss of altitude.

The passenger plane broke into two pieces and ended up in 7ft of water in the Potomac River, while the Black Hawk was upside down in the water.

A US official confirmed there were three soldiers on the Black Hawk helicopter, which was taking part in a training flight.

The audio was released by ATC, a site that focuses on aviation communications for more than 1,200 airports.

After the crash, an unidentified voice could be heard asking: "Did you see that?"

They then ask: "Black Jack Three, can you return to base?

"Black Jack Three, proceed directly... I need you to land.

"I need you to land immediately."

Black Jack is the callsign for US Coastguard helicopters.

In another clip, an air traffic controller says: "Crash, crash, crash, this is an alert three."

An alert three indicates that an aircraft has crashed on or off the airport, there is a high probability an aircraft will crash, or a pilot will have to crash land.

President Donald Trump said he had been "fully briefed on the terrible accident".

"May God Bless their souls," he said.

Mr Trump took to his social media platform, Truth Social, to ask why the helicopter didn't change course.

"The airplane was on a perfect and routine line of approach to the airport," the post read.

"The helicopter was going straight at the airplane for an extended period of time. 

"It is a CLEAR NIGHT, the lights on the plane were blazing, why didn't the helicopter go up or down, or turn? 

"Why didn't the control tower tell the helicopter what to do instead of asking if they saw the plane? 

"This is a bad situation that looks like it should have been prevented. NOT GOOD!!!"

The flight had been travelling from Wichita in Kansas to Washington DC. 

American Airlines CEO Robert Isom confirmed there were four crew on board American Eagle flight 5342, operated by PSA Airlines, along with 60 passengers.

He said it was a "difficult day for all of us at American Airlines".

"Our efforts now are focused entirely on the needs of our passengers, crew members, partners, first responders, along with their families and loved ones," he said.

"Please know that we'll continue to share accurate and timely information as soon as we can, but anything we must report must be accurate, we owe that to everyone involved.

"Our team of highly trained professionals will be working around the clock to support our passengers, crew and their families however we can and we will update you as soon as we can."

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Michael_Novakhov
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Trump says collision between American Airlines jet and Army helicopter ‘looks like it should have been prevented’

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Trump Fuels Crazy D.C. Plane Crash Theories With Insult to Army Pilots

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Though little is known about the collision, the president said it could have been prevented.

Julia Ornedo

Matt Young

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Michael_Novakhov
7 hours ago
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Inside Oct. 7's fateful hours: How chaos crippled the General Staff

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The IDF's investigation into the October 7 Hamas attack reveals a complex picture of decision-making and response under unprecedented circumstances. While then brigade commander Major General Shlomi Binder, head of the Operations Division, is credited with making correct decisions during the crisis, questions remain about the critical hours leading up to the attack and the army's overall preparedness for such a massive infiltration.

The investigation examining the Operations Division's actions during the events of October 7 concluded that the division's head at the time, Major General Shlomi Binder (then a brigadier general) made correct decisions, acted calmly, and utilized all resources at his disposal.

However, this comprehensive investigation, based on footage and recordings from "the Pit" (IDF's underground command center in Tel Aviv), only begins at 6:29 a.m.. What happened the night before the attack was not examined with the same level of detail, but only as part of a general investigation conducted by a senior officer in the Operations Directorate. The fact that this officer holds a position parallel to Binder's raises questions about the objectivity of the examination.

It's worth noting that Binder's appointment as head of the Intelligence Directorate during the war faced sharp criticism both within and outside the army. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi was accused of promoting a close associate and confidant who was head of the Operations Division on the morning of the massacre. Halevi claimed that initial findings from the investigation into the Operations Division did not prevent the appointment. However, as mentioned, the fact that the investigation looks at the events after the war was launched at 6:29 may skew the picture, and so far, no integration has been performed between the investigations.

The investigations conducted so far reveal that Major General Binder was not familiar with the "Jericho Wall" plan for a case of mass infiltration by terrorists. The most dangerous scenario he prepared for, based on intelligence assessments, was rocket fire and targeted infiltrations.

At 2:30 a.m., Binder received the first information about an unusual occurrence – from the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and not from a military intelligence source or the Southern Command. Although the information did not indicate immediate warning, Binder held a series of conversations with his subordinates and with Israeli Air Force and Navy officers.

At 4:30 a.m., a situation assessment was conducted by the head of the Operations Directorate and the chief of staff, which was brought forward from the planned morning assessment. As a result, Binder sent the head of the Southern Arena (a lieutenant colonel) to the Kirya (IDF headquarters) to prepare the situation assessment.

However, despite the accumulating intelligence signs, Binder did not conduct a comprehensive situation assessment that night, which should have preceded his commanders' consultations. In these consultations, as is known, no one assessed that an unusual event was expected. In military jargon, no "immediacy" was identified for a warning or occurrence in the Gaza Strip, but more comprehensive situation assessments and consultations in the Intelligence Directorate might have led to a different conclusion.

One of the central claims concerns Binder's late arrival at "the Pit." According to the main points of the investigation obtained by Israel Hayom, he was caught on camera entering the Supreme Command Post (HaMatzpe) only at 8:47 a.m., more than two hours after the terror attack began. The explanation given in the investigation is that Major General Binder lives in the Golan Heights, and from time to time he had to delay to give orders – as cellular reception in the descents from the Heights is disrupted. The investigation determined that his decision in this context was reasonable.

According to the investigation, when the attack began at 6:29 a.m., "the Pit" at the General Staff in the Kirya was only at basic readiness. The battle manager was a major, but due to the night's events, the head of the Southern Arena, a lieutenant colonel, also arrived to prepare materials for the planned morning situation assessment.

Despite reports of a shortage of forces in the Gaza Division, the investigation found that in practice, there was one more company than the required standard in the sector. While one can argue whether the order of forces was appropriate, there was no shortage of forces on the ground. With the start of the Hamas attack with a barrage of rockets, the Operations Division activated the forces on high alert: special units and several battalions, including a Givati battalion from the north, Battalion 450 of the NCO School, and the Gefen Battalion of Training Base 1.

At 6:36 a.m., a conversation took place involving (among others) the chief of staff, the head of the Operations Directorate, the Israeli Air Force commander, and the GOC Southern Command , where it was decided to activate the army in the broadest possible manner. By 7:30 a.m., all regular army forces and some reserve forces were activated.

The investigation, based on real-time cameras from "the Pit," shows that the television screens were operational, and there was no significant gap between the OSINT (open-source intelligence) situation picture and the information in the Pit (the claim about turned-off screens relates to other command centers in the army).

The declaration of "Hannibal" – the emergency order for a case of hostile infiltration – moved up the chain of command: the Gaza Division declared it at 6:37 a.m., the Command at 6:43 a.m., and "the Pit" at 6:48 a.m. The order gives the sector commander all the authority to deal with the infiltration, including activating air fire and special units.

The first report of an infiltration was received in "the Pit" at 6:48 a.m. in the northern sector. The reports continued to multiply: at 7:10 a.m., the Southern Command reported 8 infiltrations, and by 7:30 a.m., 15 infiltrations along the Strip were already known. Later, dozens more infiltrations were recorded, some reported and some not.

A few minutes after the attack began, a continuous video call was opened between the Southern Command and "the Pit,"where they also watched footage from additional sources. This prevented a gap in the situation picture between the General Staff and HaMatzpe. At 6:55 a.m., the head of the Southern Arena identified a sea infiltration and updated the Southern Command's operations officer, who reported to the division. In the first minutes, the chief of staff was heard reporting on the infiltration of paragliders after the then-commander of the 146th Division, Brigadier General Israel Shomer, a resident of Kfar Aza, saw it with his own eyes.

One of the central questions regarding the functioning of the Operations Division concerns the manner of allocating forces to dozens of event locations. The investigation reveals that the Gaza Division, Southern Command, and the General Staff's "Pit" struggled to form an accurate picture of the situation, partly because the reports of infiltrations seemed identical.

According to the investigation, by 7:30 a.m., the Operations Division had activated all available forces. The General Staff, through the Division, allocated forces to the Southern Command, which transferred them to the Division according to the orderly chain of command. The regional command and the division were responsible for sending forces to various points.

Around 8:00 a.m., after the chief of staff's situation assessment, the head of the Operations Directorate, Major General Oded Basiuk, entered the Pit and instructed to transition to war. He released all remaining restrictions and approved reserve mobilization. At 9:07 a.m., the Operations Division activated the "Gal" (National Mobilization) system – even before the political echelon's approval.

To the important and significant question – why the forces didn't arrive faster, the investigation found that there were physical constraints of time, organization, and travel. Most forces arrived between 9:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. The arrival, according to the investigation, was indeed not fast enough, but the IDF wasn't prepared for a scenario of hundreds and thousands of terrorists infiltrating simultaneously at dozens of points, and assumed there would be a warning allowing appropriate preparation of the order of battle.

The investigation also answers the question "Where was the army?". The answer is simple – the IDF got stuck in Sderot. The forces that arrived south positioned themselves in Ofakim and Sderot for several reasons: The situation picture, influenced among other things by the video of the armed pickup truck in Sderot – indicated fighting in the city. Many forces were directed there despite Nirim, for example, having ten times more terrorists. The assessment was that the potential for damage was greater in populated cities. Additionally, Sderot constituted a geographical bottleneck that delayed the forces' advancement southward until almost 11:00 a.m..

Painfully, forces were sent to places that managed to "cry out" louder for help. To Nirim, for example, forces arrived only after the last terrorist had left. At the Nova music festival, the army didn't understand the magnitude of the catastrophe until a late stage.

The investigation also examined why the General Staff didn't intervene more in force allocation – despite the catastrophic and chaotic situation. The main answer lies in the IDF's command structure: Southern Command was functioning, and the Gaza Division under Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld projected control of the situation – despite actually collapsing. In such a situation, according to the investigation, and considering the need to prepare for other fronts (mainly in the north), there was no justification for excessive intervention by the General Staff. Deviation from the rules of command and control, it is argued, would have created chaos.

Nevertheless, there were cases where the General Staff did intervene, but did so in cooperation with the command, not over its head. In one case, for example, it can be seen that the head of the Operations Division, Major General Binder, directs forces and commanders to communities together with the Southern Command's operations officer.

Despite the cruel and painful result of the massacre, the investigation determines that under the existing alert conditions and in the absence of intelligence warning, the conduct in the General Staff's "Pit" was generally good. However, areas for improvement were identified: better formulation of the situation picture, better utilization of multi-organizational capabilities (Shin Bet, Mossad, and other organizations that were present), faster activation of forces, and maintaining a rapid readiness array including transportation systems and helicopters.

However, the question arises whether the chosen investigation methodology is correct. The separation between night events and day events raises doubts, as decisions – or their absence – during the night substantially affected the day's events and the ability to prevent or reduce the catastrophe. An investigation of the Operations Division starting at 6:29 a.m. cannot be complete without synchronization with an examination of its conduct during the night.

The IDF Spokesperson responded with the following statement: "The IDF is in the midst of the operational debriefing process of the events of October 7 and what preceded them. The details presented in the article do not constitute the official summary of the investigation. The investigation has not yet been concluded, and when it is, it will be presented transparently to the public."

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Michael_Novakhov
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